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A crucial dimension of bridging the gap between international affairs
scholarship and policymaking is the generation of substantive, policy-
relevant research programs. We describe the use of scenario analysis as a
valuable experiential and problem-based technique for developing inno-
vative research ideas in political science. We focus especially on the
scholarly and pedagogical potential of scenarios for doctoral students by
describing the structured use of scenarios at the annual New Era Foreign
Policy Conference. The features of scenario analysis that commend its
use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists
generate policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are plausible and
textured stories that help imagine how the future political-economic
world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy
challenges. Scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief overlooked,
yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused inves-
tigation. In turn, the search for answers can shape important research
programs geared toward providing actionable clarity in understanding
contemporary global issues and challenges.
Keywords: scenario analysis, problem-based learning, research
agendas, experiential learning, bridging the gap
Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has
been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009).
Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap
between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science
1The authors are affiliated with Bridging the Gap, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. We thank
Steve Weber and Ely Ratner, who were part of the original team that initiated the New Era Foreign Policy
Conference and designed the scenario process we describe here, as well as Jim Goldgeier and Bruce Jentleson for
their collaboration and support. We are grateful for their comments and suggestions on this article. The views ex-
pressed are our own.
Barma, Naazneen H et al. (2015) “Imagine a World in Which”: Using Scenarios in Political Science. International
Studies Perspectives, doi: 10.1093/isp/ekv005
VC The Authors 2015. Published by Oxford University Presss on behalf of International Studies Association.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
International Studies Perspectives (2015) 0, 1–19
 International Studies Perspectives Advance Access published November 6, 2015
research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhanc-
ing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative
politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011;
Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives
have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts
put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, plat-
forms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their
research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective
for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing
norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric.
Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one
component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice.
Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research
programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted at-
tention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute
for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the ex-
plicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to peda-
gogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating
policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous
articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential
and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emu-
late policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman
2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for
generating and developing innovative research ideas.
This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing
a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially
on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this tech-
nique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy
Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international
and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant
scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of sce-
nario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We ar-
gue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based
learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using
scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner
in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some
of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario for-
mat. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated
with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion re-
flects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish
to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world.
What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science?
Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the
robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go be-
yond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take ad-
vantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse
exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the
2The phrase “bridging the gap” is usually attributed to Alexander George (1993). Initiatives to bridge the divide
between scholarship and policymaking in international affairs include Bridging the Gap, the Tobin Project, and the
Scholars Strategy Network.
3NEFPC is the longest standing initiative of Bridging the Gap, which is administered at American University’s
School of International Service and receives major funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
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technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” ques-
tions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serv-
ing the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in
combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not in-
herently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the prac-
tice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes
a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and de-
scribes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created.
The Art of Scenario Analysis
We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unex-
pected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, of-
ten referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts
or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they
are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with sim-
ulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institu-
tions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of
possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving
causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures.
Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one
another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes
controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil
prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale
gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declin-
ing conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recog-
nized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted
action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way.
While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning dur-
ing the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in
corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005).
Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the re-
alization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the
rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985;
Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapola-
tions of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business
environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in
most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the pre-
sent” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated
the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to
position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector.
Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policy-
making tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking
systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative fu-
tures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet
contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent applica-
tion of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of
Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating
and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alterna-
tive worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on
the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to
stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate
scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for
4National Intelligence Council (2012) is the most recent report, the fifth in the series.
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long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with
more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German
Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the poten-
tial consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013).
Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5
Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technologi-
cal, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways
to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine,
let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their
existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known
cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976;
Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help indi-
viduals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing
unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about
the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical
process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something alto-
gether different from the known present.
Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry
The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also
make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-rele-
vant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant
stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be dif-
ferent from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportuni-
ties. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured
the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be lin-
ear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of
change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic atten-
tion, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and
nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change
or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and
limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on rec-
ognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of
specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis
helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global political-
economic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in so-
cial science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very sim-
ply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing
questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation.
Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political
science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tai-
loring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below
was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generat-
ing problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy rel-
evance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here
was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus
was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented
competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state
vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the
5We are indebted to Steve Weber for these insights as well as his overall mentorship in the art and practice of
scenario analysis.
6The leadership team of advanced graduate students in political science who organized the first conference at
the University of California, Berkeley, relied on the mentorship of a senior faculty member with extensive profes-
sional scenario analysis experience in the policy and corporate realms.
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transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify,
then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7
Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with de-
tails about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possi-
ble, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of
scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable
degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the sce-
narios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the sce-
nario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially
implausible claims and systematic biases.8
An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios them-
selves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, struc-
tured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal
mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to coun-
terfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order
to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are tradi-
tionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in
the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and
are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfac-
tual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might ex-
pand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to
different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario
analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics
without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge.
We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in in-
ternational affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, histor-
ical case studies, or other methodological tools.
In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are em-
ployed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below,
includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal
mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario anal-
ysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphi-
cal representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the
research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and
Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications
within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for captur-
ing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured,
focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the
scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas.
The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer
some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the
relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typi-
cally developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idio-
syncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby
7Steve Weber imparted this concept to us. The phrase is often attributed to Geoffrey Crowther, editor of The
Economist from 1938 to 1956.
8We note two additional points in order to be self-conscious about possible sources of bias in scenario construc-
tion—a suggestion for which we thank two anonymous reviewers. First, the workshop organizers, as a group, do not
converge on a particular theoretical paradigm but share a positivist epistemology. This is not, however, a require-
ment for utilizing scenario analysis; critical theorists have also employed scenario thinking in international relations
(e.g., Patoma¨ki 2011). Second, the umbrella project focuses on American foreign policy as an object of study but
one of the group’s explicit aims was to be as deliberate as possible about building scenarios that are not
West-centric. The first set of scenarios was devised for a global scenario project, with workshops held in Haifa, Hong
Kong, Geneva, and Singapore—and participants across those four cities did not note any particular biases in the
scenarios.
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students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy
exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typi-
cally developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn
1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particu-
larly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typi-
cally base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important
in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet
studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any al-
ternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance.
The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief
that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions
likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not
appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from
past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that
could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease
out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future
so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a
period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events
analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining
the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strate-
gies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that
prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal
junctures that arise in international affairs.
Of course, policy relevance is not enough. A research topic must also contrib-
ute to the political science literature, both theoretically and empirically, be tracta-
ble, and rely upon robust social science methodology. Through the structured
and focused comparative discussion of the scenarios, participants are guided
through a process for generating problem-based research questions that are par-
ticularly amenable to the application of mid-range theory and thus well suited to
dissertation or other early research agendas. The political science discipline has
established practices for defining new puzzles within the bounds of existing re-
search. The scenario analysis process we describe here is a way to articulate such
puzzles as well as new research programs by focusing on the core questions that
emerge when imagining different ways in which the future might unfold.
Scenario Analysis at the New Era Foreign Policy Conference
The New Era Foreign Policy Conference brings together, through a competitive
application and selection process, a select group of Ph.D. candidates and postdocs
in the field of international affairs.9 The goals of the conference, which has been
held annually since 2006, are threefold: (1) to build a network of Ph.D. students
who are interested in conducting policy-relevant research on US foreign policy
and international politics, (2) to invigorate the foreign policy community with
fresh ideas and promising new avenues of research, and (3) to equip a new gener-
ation of international affairs scholars with the tools for conducting and dissemi-
nating policy-relevant research. In pursuit of these ends, NEFPC participants
employ scenarios to imagine and assess contemporary medium-term challenges
and opportunities in international affairs. In contrast to the standard, paper-based
academic conference oriented toward presenting research results, the workshop
format places a premium on unconventional thinking and idea generation and
has proven valuable as a way to identify new policy-relevant research programs.
9Based on our experience in running such scenario exercises, a relatively small group is necessary for the suc-
cess of the intensive, collaborative process described below. The group was restricted to 15–18 participants annually
until 2014 when it was slightly expanded in order to accommodate growing interest in the conference.
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Over two days, NEFPC takes participants through four main sets of activities, in-
terspersed with professional development opportunities.10 First, an introduction
to the use of scenarios as an analytical tool is conducted by a faculty member asso-
ciated with Bridging the Gap. This session emphasizes the value of using struc-
tured approaches for creative thinking and sets the ground rules for engaging in
scenario analysis. Second, small breakout groups engage in two rounds of facili-
tated and focused scenario discussions, such that each participant is immersed in
two of the three scenarios written for NEFPC. Third, all of the participants work
together through a facilitated exercise designed to cross-fertilize the unique sce-
nario experiences. This session centers on generating ideas through a structured,
focused comparison of the different breakout groups’ interpretations of each sce-
nario. Finally, the last session of the workshop is spent collectively articulating
more cogently the potential research questions that have emerged from discus-
sion and organizing the participants into groups interested in pursuing these as
active research projects. By the conclusion of the workshop, we have created a net-
work of like-minded junior scholars interested in policy-relevant political science,
while also helping participants develop and explore innovative and policy-relevant
research agendas. We now describe in more detail the two core experiential learn-
ing and knowledge creation elements of NEFPC: scenario analysis and the subse-
quent generation of research ideas through cross-fertilization.
The NEFPC Scenario Analysis Process
Scenario analysis is at the heart of the NEFPC process. Each scenario is presented
to the participants as a one-page, single-spaced write-up that conveys important el-
ements of the world of the scenario.11 This section utilizes the “Power to the
People” scenarios from the 2007 workshop to convey the content of the scenario
process (see Appendix for the full “Power to the People” scenario). The introduc-
tory section is the high-level concept, which offers—in broad-brush strokes—a
glimpse into the world of the scenario. This part helps participants familiarize
themselves with the dynamic contours of the new world. “Power to the People” be-
gins with the following high-level concept:
[T]he world of 2012 is seeing new and dramatic forms of political reorganization.
Technology and culture together enable the deconcentration and decentralization
of power, simultaneously challenging conceptions of the international community
and traditional international organizations, and undermining and replacing the
functions of national governments with new experiments at the national, regional,
and local levels.
Participants are thus invited to envision a world of rampant political change, as
new lines of organization develop around culture and technology instead of
around strong, centralized nation-states.
The second part of the scenario is the driving forces section, which describes the
currents and elements that shape this world. This section highlights causal trends,
significant developments and breaks from the past, and other important features
of the scenario. These details allow participants to add substance to the snapshot
offered in the high-level concept, including the identification of currencies of
power, relevant commodities, economic strategies, key actors, and suggestions of
10The scenario-based core of NEFPC is interspersed with a variety of networking opportunities with senior schol-
ars, workshop alumni, and foreign policy experts, as well as professional development sessions, where participants
learn about professional opportunities, fellowship competitions, writing for a policy audience, and fundraising for
policy-relevant research.
11The three scenarios and two templates that guide the scenario process are distributed to the participants prior
to the workshop.
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lines of both cleavage and cohesion. In exploring the driving forces, participants
discuss explicitly the competing or complementary hypotheses and various causal
logics that underpin the scenario.
Once the participants have been fully immersed in the logical narrative of the
scenario, the third component—the deepening phase—explores an exemplary
event, and outlines a number of other observable implications within the con-
tours of the scenario. The significant event of “Power to the People” occurs as “ex-
tremely rich individuals from around the globe” step to the fore to confront the
most recent case of genocide, “citing the unwillingness of the international com-
munity to act.” They organize to design, fund, and deploy a privately financed
peacekeeping operation to the Sudan in order to enforce a cease-fire. This is sig-
nificant in that it demonstrates the new organizational contours of this world, as
people step in to fulfill the traditional governance obligations of states.
An important tenet of scenario analysis is that “[w]hat happens at a scenario’s ho-
rizon date is not as important as the storyline’s clarity of logic and how it helps
open the mind to new dynamics” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 6). Indeed, it has
not been unusual for participants to find elements of the scenarios implausible
at first, and a key function of the facilitators is to help participants move past any
initial skepticism.12 Moreover, we have seen elements of each scenario realized
in contemporary international affairs. For example, while “Power to the People” to-
day closely resembles dynamics associated with the Arab Spring of 2011, the sce-
nario was initially designed in 2007. Similarly, the “Sick, Sick World” scenario
developed in 2007 on the basis of contemporary trends posited a global financial
crisis set off by the bursting of the housing market in the United States that, in
turn, led to a period of relative decline for the Western world. Several participants
at the initial NEFPC—and at four related global workshops13—expressed deep
skepticism about the plausibility of such a crisis. In a testament to the value of the
scenario process, participants who experienced scenarios such as these were among
the first to analyze the global dynamics of situations that later surprised and en-
gaged policymakers around the world. Yet the scenario is a tool to facilitate creative
thinking, not a predictive end in and of itself. More important than any prescience
is the value of thinking about unfamiliar futures that may have roots in the contem-
porary system.
The scenario analysis breakout sessions proceed in two parts, with the facilitators
using poster-sized templates to generate discussion and debate among the partici-
pants and graphically capture the world of the scenario and the questions it
raises.14 First, we focus on collectively understanding the scenario (see Figure 1).
Here the participants discuss the most important aspects of the scenario and begin
to engage intellectually with the changes that are said to have occurred between
the present day and the future world. While examining “Power to the People,” for
example, participants might note the development of nontraditional cultural and
kinship networks along both subnational and ethnic lines. Whereas states were
once able to perform the basic functions of governance, now, unable to do so, they
outsource to nontraditional actors—private sector security organizations, a variety
12The quality of the scenario-based approach depends on the caliber and enthusiastic participation of the partic-
ipants as well as on skilled facilitation. NEFPC facilitators are experienced workshop alumni who have been trained
by the organizers in guiding scenario analysis sessions and capturing the discussion using the templates. They are
also prepped with strategies for managing participants who are initially inclined to challenge the scenario itself or
get locked into ideological arguments about it.
13In our first year (2006), we conducted a series of workshops with scholars and policymakers in Haifa, Hong
Kong, Geneva, and Singapore to explore how various regional actors perceived the challenges facing the United
States differently.
14Emily Shepard designed these templates for our use in collaboration with the NEFPC team. We are grateful
for her permission to replicate them here.
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of humanitarian NGOS, and mega-philanthropists with global designs. In exploring
these and other notable dynamics described in the scenario, participants find forms
of organization and networking that are radically different from the state-led world
to which we as analysts have become accustomed.
Figure 1. Understanding the scenario discussion template.
Figure 2. Scenario implications discussion template.
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Second, we collectively explore the implications of the changes discussed in the
scenario and the developments that might follow (see Figure 2). The discussion is
designed to probe who benefits and who is disadvantaged in the scenario and to
consider the role of the United States and other key actors given the new con-
straints and opportunities embedded in the language of the scenario.15 Thus, in
“Power to the People,” participants might ponder how the United States would re-
spond to the groundswell of populism in the Middle East, how international orga-
nizations might react to the outsourcing of traditional statist roles, and how
influential individuals will interface with those states that are able to maintain
their power and centralized control.
As discussed above, the scenario templates represent a carefully formulated set
of questions used to examine the three scenario cases. In turn, as we discuss next,
they help to facilitate a structured comparison of the alternative worlds and aid in
the subsequent generation of research agendas.
Cross-Fertilization and the Generation of Research Programs
Following the individual scenario discussions held in breakout groups, the work-
shop participants collectively engage in a process of cross-fertilization to develop
new ideas for research. The participants identify new or noteworthy themes that
emerged in the scenario conversations and then, led by the facilitators, group
these issues of interest into broad sets of research questions. Typically, this is a rel-
atively organic process: as participants begin brainstorming about emerging
themes or tensions from across the scenarios, the facilitators also encourage the
group to focus on how political science might help investigate these topics and
provide novel answers. In essence, this stage guides a problem-based method of
inquiry: it begins with puzzles emerging from the forward-looking scenarios,
moves to a collective discussion of the dozens of discrete ideas the scenarios gen-
erate, and then helps to shape these into research topics.
The cross-fertilization stage begins with participants exploring the comparative
versions of the scenario template posters. They are asked to identify surprising or
puzzling elements, important matters common to all three scenarios, or noteworthy
points of contrast between two versions of one scenario or across the different sce-
narios. Hence, participants consider what factors appear to be significant no matter
which alternative world unfolds, as well as differentiating, in a structured manner,
among the core causal forces leading into one alternative future versus another.
Providing very wide latitude in terms of what the participants find noteworthy and
valuable for discussion produces many individual threads of discussion.16 Through
the exploration of the scenarios, participants have been encouraged to question
their assumptions and to think creatively about possible future states of interna-
tional affairs where these preconceptions might no longer hold. The traditional ac-
ademic experience trains students to think within the parameters of disciplinary
debates, be they theoretical, empirical, or methodological. The NEFPC scenario ex-
ercise is intended to create an intellectual environment in which imaginative think-
ing outside the traditional strictures is encouraged. The scenarios and the process
in which they are embedded serve as a tool for identifying new areas of academic
inquiry, which are now discussed as much as participants wish.
The final session of NEFPC is designed to take the broad lines of inquiry that
have been identified and narrow them into more feasible research projects. At
15While our project has maintained a focus on the US role in the world, this is not a necessary component of
the scenario process. It can easily be adapted to center on one or more different states, institutions, or other actors,
including the interaction of multiple actors within a given set of scenarios.
16As a practical matter, we have hung the scenario posters around the workshop room walls or attached them to
large easels. We have also used large easel pads for the participants to note their observations in short phrases that
then serve as the focal points of group discussion.
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this point in the workshop, the scenarios themselves are no longer central—they
have served as the analytical scaffolding upon which the subsequent discussion
about research programs rests. This final step focuses participants back on the po-
litical science discipline, but with fresh ideas to bring to their scholarship.
Participants are now less concerned about the imagined futures and more about
the theories and tools of social science and how best to leverage these in the con-
struction of new research programs. We can now focus on what the scenario pro-
cess has illuminated—key independent and dependent variables, new causal
relationships, previously unexplored phenomena, and familiar phenomena seen
in a new light. We can recognize the possibility of divergence from anticipated
trend lines and think beyond existing paradigms or consider how to redeploy
standard ones in a new way. And we can discuss how to connect these issues to ex-
isting political science scholarship and tackle the puzzles they pose with rigorous
analytical methods.
Thus, for the final session, the workshop facilitators synthesize the issues aris-
ing from the cross-fertilization session into three to four baskets of topics under
broad rubrics. In the past, these themes have included such issues as the role of tech-
nology in facilitating governmental change, new methods of autocratic repression,
and the changing nature of public goods provision in the international system. The
facilitators then lead participants in discussing these thematic threads, working to-
gether to distill the raw insights into discrete research topics and questions. For ex-
ample, one discussion of “new methods of autocratic repression,” led to the
questions of whether and how autocratic regimes learn from the success and failures
of other regimes’ repressive actions. As the group delves into each thematic basket
and sharpens the ideas into narrower and more specific research questions, it also
considers how political science scholars would answer such questions in terms of
both substance and method. In considering the question about autocratic learning,
the group discussed what types of research methods might be useful, what scholar-
ship currently exists on the topic, and what data exist to give participants a starting
point for their own projects. After working through each research question within
each topical thread, the participants and facilitators have a better sense of the range
of specific research questions they can ask, as well as different approaches they can
adopt to answer them in a robust and policy-relevant way.
At the close of the research question-generation session, the facilitators orga-
nize panels for the following year’s International Studies Association (ISA) annual
meeting—a preeminent conference for scholars of international affairs. These
panels are organized around the broad themes discussed; there are usually two to
four panels per year, with each panel consisting of three to five papers based on
the research questions developed at the workshop.17 Participants volunteer to de-
velop the panel submissions—including the task of seeking out more senior chairs
and discussants to ensure helpful feedback on the research—and to write the in-
dividual papers for the panels. At the following year’s ISA meeting, workshop
alumni present the resulting research papers on these panels. Thus NEFPC keeps
an eye on ensuring that participants turn their research questions into publish-
able papers that can both boost their academic careers and potentially inform the
policy community.
Benefits of the New Era Foreign Policy Conference Scenario Approach
The scenario analysis workshop experience helps participants become better
scholars by acquiring a tool to generate fresh, policy-relevant research ideas and
17At the 2013 ISA meeting in San Francisco, for example, panels explored public goods provision in the interna-
tional arena, the causes and consequences of economic stagnation and resurgence, and the implications of rapidly
developing and global technology for international politics.
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produce research on that basis. NEFPC also offers participants the opportunity to
cement professional skills and connect to a network of like-minded peers. It thus
offers a number of important assets for scholars who hope to work at the nexus of
international relations scholarship and policy relevance.
In the first instance, the scenario-based approach develops students’ ability to
identify interesting questions by encouraging them to think creatively about what
the world may look like in a few years and asking what we would need and want to
know about that world. In turn, the NEFPC experience teaches them how to nar-
row down significant insights into researchable questions. For example, if the sce-
nario world we discuss is one populated by a growing number of autocratic
regimes that learn from each other, participants might ask how—and under what
conditions—autocratic regimes have learned historically as a way to shed light on
an issue that might become relevant in the near future. This question is interest-
ing to the policy community, researchable from a practical perspective, speaks to
an important debate in the international relations literature, and could easily
serve as the basis for a journal article or a dissertation.
Conversations like those facilitated at NEFPC are important given that it is not
self-evident what makes for an acceptable and feasible research question in politi-
cal science. Few doctoral students begin their studies with inherent knowl-
edge concerning the requisite breadth and depth of scholarly projects.
Rather, students learn through exposure to the norms and conventions of the dis-
cipline. Exploring substantive topics and ways to analyze them in this experiential
setting allows junior scholars to learn from one another, with the guidance of a
handful of more seasoned academics, and to develop new analytical and re-
search skills. NEFPC thus openly introduces another layer of disciplinary socializa-
tion through a process we view as complementary to the core training received by
students in their coursework and home departments. Consequently, we do not
compare the success of this program to other types of training but rather view it
as yet another way to help young scholars produce rigorous, policy-relevant
scholarship.
Second, the scenario-based approach helps facilitate the production of scholar-
ship by assembling conference panel proposals that explore some of the re-
search questions developed during the workshop and by inspiring graduate
students to develop tangible research ideas they can turn into publications. Over
the past ten years, NEFPC alumni have successfully proposed and presented about
twenty ISA panels, with a total of more than seventy papers. Many of these papers
have been well-received,18 and graduate students and junior faculty have
published articles with both academic and policy relevance based on the ideas de-
veloped at the workshop (Barma, Ratner, and Weber 2007, 2013; Barma and
Whitlark 2013; Bleek and Lorber 2014; Feaver and Lorber 2014). By guiding
participants through a process for generating researchable ideas and turning
those ideas into conference papers, pieces of dissertations, and possible publica-
tions, NEFPC helps prepare these young scholars for their careers as professional
political scientists.
Third, some of the ideas developed at NEFPC and refined through the aca-
demic publication process have been transmitted to policymakers. A core theme
that emerged at the first workshop, for example, was the increasing power and in-
terconnectivity of the emerging economies in the non-Western world. Building
on that insight, three NEFPC founders wrote two policy-oriented pieces on what
they dubbed the “World Without the West” in The National Interest (Barma,
Ratner, and Weber 2007, 2013), which attracted attention in policy circles
18For example, Seva Gunitsky, a 2009 NEFPC alumnus, received Honorable Mention for the Carl Beck Award at
the 2010 ISA annual meeting for his paper on power transitions and normative change. The award is presented to
the best paper authored by a graduate student at the annual meeting.
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(National Intelligence Council 2008).19 They also worked with other colleagues to
produce an empirical investigation of the concept that appeared in a peer-re-
viewed scholarly journal (Barma et al. 2009). Another participant developed a
workshop-inspired project on the difficulty of unwinding economic sanctions and
the challenges this poses for the successful use of coercive diplomacy. He co-au-
thored an article on the subject (Feaver and Lorber 2014) and then presented his
work to former NEFPC participants working in government during the Obama
Administration’s Fall 2014 push toward an interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program. A number of workshop alumni have held senior positions in the na-
tional security decision-making apparatus, serving for example on the National
Security Council as Deputy National Security Advisors and as staff on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Others hold senior positions at major foreign pol-
icy think tanks. Through the NEFPC network, participants are able to disseminate
their ideas directly to these policymakers.
Fourth, NEFPC builds a network of political scientists interested in policy-rele-
vant issues. Many of the graduate students and young faculty who participate in
the workshop have interests in similar topics. Bringing together these junior
scholars early in their careers provides them with the opportunity to know, learn
from, and work with others who will be their colleagues throughout their careers,
including important connections with more senior scholars. The network has al-
ready produced collaboration in many areas, as indicated by several of the re-
search projects and publications mentioned above. In addition, as part of this
network, participants engage with like-minded scholars who believe in the role
that academics have to play in informing foreign policy decision making.
Although in some political science departments today discussing this goal openly
is taboo—especially for a doctoral candidate or untenured scholar—NEFPC and
Bridging the Gap support, encourage, and embrace it.
This network expands overseas as well. A related Bridging the Gap project em-
ploying scenarios, the New Era International workshop, took place in December
2013 at the Singapore Management University. Over two days, seventeen scholars
and policy analysts from across Asia used a focused set of scenarios to explore the
provision of public goods in Southeast Asia, with a particular emphasis on the re-
spective roles played by the United States, China, and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. The three scenarios for this workshop pos-
ited different power trajectories for each of these actors. Through our discussion
and comparison across these possible futures, we considered how the regional
provision of two types of public goods—infectious disease prevention and energy
governance—could develop, and who might be positioned to positively influence
this evolution. While the research outputs from this workshop are still developing,
participants expressed great enthusiasm for the scenario process and the insights
it provided.
Fifth, given the significant amount of interest among major grant organizations
for projects that pursue policy-relevant research, NEFPC helps to position partici-
pants with an increased chance of receiving external support, an important crite-
rion and metric for success in academia. Over the past few years, the Smith
Richardson Foundation, the Stanton Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the
MacArthur Foundation, and the Minerva Research Initiative, among others, have
given millions of dollars to projects that utilize political science methods to ex-
plore policy-relevant topics—and numerous workshop alumni have competed suc-
cessfully for these funding sources.
19The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 report included a scenario entitled “A World without
the West” (National Intelligence Council 2008).
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Teaching with Scenarios
The observed benefits of scenario analysis for scholarly research are echoed in
many ways by its use in teaching.20 The method is extremely flexible because in-
structors can tailor both the content of the scenarios and the analytical process to
accomplish learning objectives across many different types of curricula. And while
the scenario process described above was designed specifically for international
relations and foreign policy analysis within the discipline of political science, the
model is certainly applicable elsewhere, including in other fields of social science.
Here, we consider the possible uses of scenarios for teaching at the doctoral, mas-
ter’s, and undergraduate levels.
Doctoral
We have already highlighted some of the pedagogical benefits of scenario analysis
for doctoral students. Not only can this approach help students identify new and
interesting research topics, it can also provide an opportunity to consider how the
conceptual and theoretical frameworks of their discipline interact with real-world
problems and policies.
For students early in their doctoral programs, scenarios that cover a broad
range of issues—such as those presented above—might be most helpful for identi-
fying new research agendas and even dissertation topics. Indeed, several NEFPC
participants have noted the value of the workshop for “road testing” the theories
covered in their international relations and comparative politics field seminars. A
one- or two-week scenario exercise would be a valuable addition to many such
courses, both as a way to apply and contrast elements of the existing literature
and as an opportunity to identify interesting topics requiring further exploration.
For later stage candidates, the process could be helpful for finding a new project
beyond one’s dissertation.
In courses with a narrower focus, scenarios could be written to provide analytical
leverage on the politics of a specific region, topic, or set of actors. Consider, for ex-
ample, the debate over nuclear proliferation in international relations. Scholars
such as Kenneth Waltz have argued that proliferation can make conflict less likely
by increasing the number of states with strong deterrent capabilities (Sagan and
Waltz 2003). Others disagree. Scott Sagan, for example, has noted that the condi-
tions for stable deterrence—including symmetrical nuclear forces and second-strike
capabilities, and the ability to avoid accidental war—are difficult if not impossible to
achieve in most contexts (Sagan and Waltz 2003). Scenarios can be employed to un-
derstand better the nuances and implications of this debate. Students might, for ex-
ample, examine these arguments through a set of scenario futures that describe
different outcomes in the Pakistan–India relationship, including nuclear conflict,
conventional conflict, and no conflict. Through the process of “deepening” the sce-
narios, students would be challenged to identify different causal pathways that might
lead to each outcome, as well as which factors seem most and least influential. Such
an approach would provide an opportunity to consider different methods for study-
ing the topic, such as the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for ob-
taining a certain result. This effort would also require students to apply their
empirical knowledge of nuclear force structures and regional dynamics to a more
general theoretical debate. A similar approach could be used to explore varied fu-
tures relating to development trajectories, regional integration dynamics, the poli-
tics of energy and natural resources, or almost any other topic of interest to scholars
of international relations, comparative politics, or other social science subfields.
20Note the distinction between our use of the term scenario and that employed in many ethics courses, in which
students are asked how they would respond to a narrowly defined hypothetical situation or dilemma (cf. Weber
1992; Wielhouwer 2004).
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In addition, exposure to a variety of pedagogical techniques in a Ph.D. program
can help students when they become teachers themselves. On the job market, stu-
dents will be asked to demonstrate that they are prepared to bring innovative and
effective techniques into their own classrooms. Scenario analysis is thus a useful
addition to a student’s teaching toolbox.
Master
Scenario analysis is an especially useful tool for instructors in public policy, public
administration, and other professionally focused master’s programs. These pro-
grams place a heavy emphasis on connecting theory to practice, and have long
employed case studies, role-playing exercises, and other hands-on techniques for
training their students. Scenarios provide another way for professional students to
develop their analytical and practical skills through problem-based learning. In
addition to the intellectual benefits described in the sections above, the scenario
process can give master’s students a chance to serve as facilitators, rapporteurs,
and discussion leaders, depending on the instructor’s objectives for the course.
Scenario exercises can also couple well with various communication assign-
ments—such as policy memoranda, briefing books, and formal presentations—
that are well suited to the professional goals of master’s-level students. Given the
increasing use of scenarios throughout the public, private, and nonprofit sectors,
such training will also be appealing to a wide range of employers.
Undergraduate
Using scenarios in undergraduate courses presents a unique set of challenges and
rewards. Most undergraduate students are neither looking to start major research
projects nor seeking to develop a specific set of skills for professional policy work.
Moreover, undergraduates often do not have the requisite breadth of conceptual
and historical knowledge to develop a full understanding of complex scenarios
and their implications. The goals and methods of an undergraduate scenario ex-
ercise will likely be different from those at the graduate level.
Even so, scenarios can be a very valuable tool in the college-level classroom. For
example, scenario analysis can be used to ask “what comes next?” at the conclu-
sion of survey courses in international relations and US foreign policy. In such
classes, students are often particularly susceptible to believing that the world will
continue to evolve along current trend lines—e.g., that nonstate actors will be in-
creasingly important in international affairs, or that the US–China relationship
will define global politics in the twenty-first century. Well-crafted scenarios pro-
pose alternative dynamics that force students to question their assumptions, ide-
ally by bringing related course content into their analyses. Importantly, a basic
scenario exercise does not require the detailed logistics or infrastructure (formal
templates, guided breakout sessions, etc.) employed at the workshop described
above. Rather, an instructor can try out the approach by following three basic
steps: first, write up a set of one to three one-page scenarios describing different
possible futures; second, give students time to consider and discuss these in small
groups, either during or outside of class; and, third, facilitate a discussion of inter-
esting questions and observations that the scenarios raise, including cross-fertiliza-
tion across different scenarios. With experience, the technique can then be
adapted to be more complex and to meet additional learning objectives.
Finally, a growing body of research finds that students learn best in a diverse
and active learning environment (Brown and King 2000; Burch 2000; Asal 2005;
Glasgow 2012). The scenario approach adds another lens through which to ana-
lyze complicated political dynamics in a fun, interactive, and experiential way.
Scenarios also accord well with the “flipped classroom,” in which students learn
facts and concepts outside the classroom—such as through recorded lectures or
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podcasts—and then apply these critically during class. For example, the “Power to
the People” scenario described above could be used to address readings or other
preparation on social movements, democratization, specific regional dynamics, or
a host of related topics. In this way, scenario analysis may be most fruitful in the
undergraduate classroom when it is used to explore and test material that has al-
ready been covered, rather than to introduce new material.
Conclusion
Crucial dimensions of bridging the gap between international affairs scholarship
and policymaking include the production of substantive, policy-relevant research
programs and the equipping of a new generation of political science students
with the skills to connect theory to practice. This article has made the case that
scenario analysis is a valuable experiential and problem-based technique for the
political science discipline, bringing both scholarly and pedagogical benefits.
Because scenarios can aid political scientists in imagining plausible alternative
worlds in the future, applying this technique to contemporary international affairs
offers a structured, comparative process for generating research agendas on oth-
erwise overlooked and crucial issues. In addition, because this analytical exercise
encourages identifying these issues now—well before decision makers are likely to
confront them—it enables political scientists to begin pursuing the necessary re-
search to provide policymakers with empirically robust and useful answers to im-
portant policy questions that will become significant down the road.
One aim in deploying the process we have described here is to accelerate innova-
tion in policy-relevant political science scholarship by shifting mental maps and
thereby illuminating new and essential areas of inquiry. Scenario analysis can be an
invaluable aid to scholars in asking questions that are not being asked in policy cir-
cles, building middle-range theory to propose answers to those questions, and then
communicating the answers to decision makers in ways they can use. Intended to
complement traditional methods of political science training, the New Era Foreign
Policy Conference aims to equip an emerging cohort of graduate students and
junior scholars with the tools to incorporate the kind of thinking that scenarios
provoke as a central ingredient of their scholarship. This undertaking is hence a
two-sided statement about bridging the gap. It embraces the value of immersion in
contemporary international affairs to the political science discipline, in the belief
that policy relevant research contributes to the overall diversity of the field without
diluting its epistemological commitments. It also takes seriously the goal of policy
relevance as one important metric of the quality of scholarship, in the belief that
political scientists are well placed to inform and enliven public debate. For, in the
end, we at Bridging the Gap feel that it is the collective responsibility of our
discipline to engage with and contribute to the public sphere. Scenarios and the
workshop model described here provide one avenue to that end.
Appendix: “Power to the People” Scenario
1. The world of 2012 is seeing new and dramatic forms of political reorganization.
Technology and culture together enable the deconcentration and decentralization
of power, simultaneously challenging conceptions of the international community
and traditional international organizations, and undermining and replacing the
functions of national governments with new experiments at the national, regional,
and local levels.
2. Various groups in the world have strengthened their organization around nonna-
tion-state centric forms of governance such as cross-national cultural and kinship net-
works and subnational ethnic splinter groups.
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• Preferential economic arrangements, long opposed by liberal internationalists,
are increasingly common and legitimate. They are not regional (i.e., delineated
by geography) so much as they are cultural and ethnic (delineated by identity
politics, such as technology-enabled kinship networks; e.g., the Chinese bamboo
network, and hawala financing in the Islamic world).
• States in some parts of the world are increasingly unable to provide basic gover-
nance functions to their populations and are de facto “outsourcing” those func-
tions to a variety of other actors, including private sector security organizations,
humanitarian and health NGOs, and mega-philanthropists with global agendas.
3. Citing the unwillingness of the international community to act in stopping ongo-
ing genocide, a collection of extremely rich individuals from around the globe
(Richard Branson, Lakshmi Mittal, and George Soros) have raised and deployed pri-
vately financed peacekeeping forces to enforce a cease-fire in Sudan. They are poised
to extend the deployment of their troops to Chad and the Congo.
4. Other observations:
• Other failing African states, witnessing this intervention, outsource the majority
of their principal governance functions to a Gates Foundation/McKinsey con-
sortium led by Jeffrey Sachs.
• In parts of the Islamic world, radical parties have led revolutions, creating popu-
list, anti-Western, capitalist regimes that are economically successful, magnets
for foreign direct investment, and remain dedicated to the destruction of Israel.
• In the United States and parts of Western Europe, fully private cities that are
owned, controlled, and governed by private corporations emerge to attract spe-
cific religious and cultural groups.
• By 2012, Iraq has fully disintegrated into three independent self-governing prov-
inces. Rather than being an isolated incident, this is part of a larger trend. Who
sits in Iraq’s seat at the UN? Which other nations have left the UN as a result
(Turkey, Iran)?
• Traditional international organizations are engaged in massive legal battles.
Confusion reigns over who is empowered to sign ‘treaties’ and other global con-
tractual arrangements in this world.
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